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ABSTRACT:  The five Great Lakes  can be classified as  a common property or open
access  resource.  This  is a consequence of the lack of a well-defined system of
property rights governing water use  in the lakes.  Decisions by  interested parties
are  interconnected, since withdrawing water from one point may affect water levels
in the entire system.  This,  in turn, can adversely affect hydropower production and
commercial navigation.  Contributing to the complexity of the problem are  the eight
U.S.  states, two Canadian provinces and the two federal governments.  Game  theory is
implemented to describe this situation.  Several games are constructed to  describe
different market structures.  Of particular interest is  the number of players that
participate in the game, as  well as  the expectations which they hold.  Open-loop
(where players commit themselves  to  future actions) and closed-loop (where players
do not commit themselves to  future actions) are compared for the ten players  game
(eight states  and two provinces), two players game  (U.S. versus Canada) and one
player game  (a social planner's solution).  It  is shown that trying to  solve an
open-loop game  ignores part of the externalities  involved, and thus can
underestimate  the social loss  involved in these lakes.
KEY TERMS:  Common property resources, game theory, water diversions, Great Lakes
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The five Great Lakes,  located between the U.S. and Canada, are tied together
by one common outlet to the ocean.  When combined, they are  the largest fresh
surface water body in the world (20% of the world's fresh water stock, and 95%  of
the American continent's).  Lake  Superior is considered the largest lake in the
world, and Lakes Michigan and Huron are  the fifth and sixth largest, respectively
(Task Force, 1985).  This enormous body of water, combined with an increasing demand
for water, gives rise  to proposals for transferring the water for use  outside the
lakes  and basin.
Water from the  lakes  has both stock and flow uses.  While the flow uses  accrue
only to  the parties that withdraw water from the lakes,  that is not necessarily true
with respect to  the use of water as  a stock, which is  spread over the whole system.
This  situation can be represented as  a game,  since the outcome  of this  situation to
each and every player depends not only on his or her actions, but on other players
actions  (Becker and Easter,  1989).  Since decisions and the benefits and costs to
each player extend over time,  the  game  is a dynamic one.  The external effects on
each player come indirectly through the lake level, which influences their uses.
This  study concentrates on the  two industries  that will be the major losers
when lake levels are reduced:  commercial navigation and hydropower production.
Damages  to lakeshore properties are not included because water diversions decrease
lake levels, while damages  to  shore property tend to occur during high lake levels.
Other uses  of water,  i.e.,  fishing, recreation and wildlife, were found to be less
sensitive, and will only change  the results marginally (IJC,  1981).
It is  important to understand why game  theory should be applied to  the Great
Lakes management questions.  One approach would be to perform several benefit-cost
2analyses,  for several diversion proposals (David et al.,  1988,  IJC, 1981).  However,
the core  issue  is  that, as long as there are a finite number of parties  involved in
lake management, a change in lake levels can and probably will bring about changes
in their decisions with respect to  how much water to  take out of the lake.
Performing a discrete benefit-cost analysis  is not the "end of the game," but only
one possible outcome.  Thus, the results from benefit-cost analysis  could be
misleading.
The dynamic game theory makes a distinction between an open-loop and a closed-
loop equilibria  (Clemhout and Wan, 1979).  The difference between those two
equilibria is not only in the value of the variables, but in the environment that
they try  to describe.  The open-loop equilibrium ignores part of the externalities
involved in withdrawing water from the Great Lakes.  The result of these  two
equilibria will be compared in this paper to determine  the importance of this
external cost.
THE GREAT LAKES SYSTEM
The Great Lakes system consists of a series of five major lakes which are
connected by four channels.  Flows out of lakes Superior and Ontario are  regulated,
while they are not in lakes  Michigan-Huron and Erie.  The system has a surface water
area of  5,475 square miles.  Lake Superior  is  the furthest to the west while Ontario
is  the farthest east.  The direction of the flow is  from Lake Superior  through St.
Mary's River into Lake Huron.  Because of the wide connecting channel between Lake
Huron and Lake Michigan, water can flow between these two lakes  in both directions.
This flow tends to equalize the lake  levels,  thus,  they are usually considered as
one lake.  Lake Huron outflow runs  through the  St. Clair River and Lake St. Clair,
and the Detroit River to Lake Erie, which drains through the Niagara River to Lake
3Ontario.  Lake Ontario outflows pass through the  St. Lawrence River to  the Atlantic
Ocean.
Currently, there are five major diversions.  Two diversions  (Long Lake and
Ogoki) divert water into Lake Superior from Ontario, Canada.  Another takes water
out of Lake Michigan, through  the Chicago diversion, to  the Mississippi River.  The
Welland Canal connects Lake Erie  to Lake Ontario and it bypasses  Niagara Falls.
Finally, the New York State Barge  Canal takes water from the Niagara River  into Lake
Ontario. Besides diversions  to  and from the  lakes,  there  is  also a consumptive use
component which, in contrast to  the diversions, is not well documented  (Frerich and
Easter,  1988).
While on the average water  in equals water out,  in reality these components  are
not fixed, and thus lake  levels change  from month to month.  The  seasonality of the
hydrologic characteristics  is  reflected in higher lake levels in the spring and
early summer, and a gradual drop during the remainder of the year.  The natural
supplies  to the  lakes are large relative to  the range of flows on the connecting
channels, which are remarkably constant.  This fact will have an effect later upon
our results, since changes  in a given lake will be absorbed by other  lakes only
after a long period of time.  If there  is a long-run change  in the water supply to
the  lake  (i.e.,  a diversion),  the outflow is  adjusted in such a way that  the  system
will reach a new equilibrium after a period of time, with a new steady state  lake
level and flows in the connecting channels.
Consumptive water use  in the Great Lakes basin will continue  to grow as the
population and economy expand.  In addition, there will be periodic pressures to
increase water diversions, particularly from the Chicago diversion, when lake  levels
are high or river levels are low.  However, the future demand for Great Lakes water
involves many uncertainties.  If the earth warms up  and the upper midwest becomes
4drier,  then demand could be greatly expanded.  In contrast, abundant rains  could
slow the  growth in demand to a trickle.  Given this uncertainty, this  study focuses
on the supply side and assumes  that there will be demand for whatever amount is
supplied at  $100 per ac.  ft.  This price for water is on the low side for most water
uses  except for agriculture which cannot pay much more than $50 per ac.  ft.
COST OF WITHDRAWALS
The major cost of most new diversions or withdrawals  is  the  fixed costs.  For
example,  fixed costs of diverting 10,000 cfs from Lake Superior to the Missouri
River Basin were estimated at  $10 billion while the annual variable costs were
estimated at  $10 million.  The  fixed costs  for a relatively small Lake Erie
diversion were estimated to be $3.2 billion (DeCooke et al,  1984 and Banks,  1982).
For this  model the fixed costs for new water diversions  or withdrawals are based on
the  Superior-Missouri River and the Lake Erie transfers amortized over an infinite
time horizon.  The operating and maintenance costs are fixed per 1 thousand cfs
costs.
Because of the complexity of the system, a hydrologic response model  (HRM) is
used to  estimate the external effect of water withdrawals from the Great Lakes
system (Quinn, 1978, Hartmann, 1988).  The changes  in Lake Superior's hydrologic
component are accounted for  in the lower lakes by passing the change, according to
the Lake Superior regulation plan, through  the St. Mary's River flow, which  is part
of the HRM.  Lake Ontario is  not considered, however, in the HRM, since  it does not
affect anything upstream due to Niagara Falls.  Changes  in Lake Ontario levels  are
derived using the Lake Ontario regulation plan algorithm (plan 1958-D),  adjusted by
the effect of the upper lakes.  These three simulation models account  for the whole
system and result in monthly lake levels and water flows in the connecting channels.
5The key external cost components  in this analysis are  the effect on the
industries  that use  the water as a stock;  commercial navigation and hydropower
production.  In order  to  simplify the analysis,  it was assumed that these costs  are
quadratic relative  to  lake levels.  That can be thought of as a Taylor expansion
only over the  first two arguments.  Before describing the method used to obtain
these costs,  several additional assumptions should be mentioned.  In order to gain
insight into these two  industries,  it was assumed that the current diversions and
consumptive use remain the  same.  In other words, the effect of withdrawing water is
in addition to the existing withdrawals.  Moreover, with respect to  the commercial
navigation,  it was assumed that the demand for shipped goods  is  totally elastic,
while the supply  is  totally inelastic.  That is,  all the costs incurred by lower
lake levels will fall on the shipping industries.  Further research is needed,
however, with respect to whether goods  can be shipped in alternative ways, and
whether part of the cost can be shifted to the consumers.  With respect  to  the
hydropower production, it was assumed that the demand function is  totally inelastic,
but cannot be totally supplied by hydropower generations.  That is,  every power
capacity loss due to  lower lake levels  (and lower outflows  in the connecting
channels) will result in shifting to higher cost modes.  The difference between
these costs  is  the loss  to consumers, which in this case is within the system (Great
Lakes states and provinces).
Navigation on the Great Lakes:  Reduced lake levels will increase the cost to  the
shipping industries,  since ships will have to carry less;  and in order to ship  the
same quantity, they will have to make more trips.  These additional trips are  the
loss  to the  shipping industry.  It  is  implicitly assumed that all  the other factors
of production are smoothly adjusted to changing lake levels,  thus the only factor
6responsible for the loss  is  the reduced lake levels.
The loss for the shipping industry was estimated by calculating monthly trip
hours for each state for every lake that the state has access  to.  The data was
taken from Water Borne Commerce of the United States  (WCUS), 1977-1986.  Almost 200
million short tons  are shipped on  the  lakes annually.  The hourly cost was used to
attach cost  to the number of trip hours.  In order  to obtain the cost  in terms of
losses,  the base cost was  set at the highest lake  levels during the period January
1980 to December 1986,  and a value of zero cost was attached to  it.  The  cost then
was adjusted to be the additional cost due to  reduced lake  levels.  This additional
cost  (loss) vector was regressed on lake level change for  that period without a
constant.
(1)  Lossi,L,t - a (DLLLt)  + b  (DLLL,t)2.
Where:  NLOSSi,L,t - loss  to  player i on lake L at time t (navigation).
DLLL,t  = decreased lake  level at Lake L at time  t and;
a,b  - coefficients to be estimated.
Hydropower Production on the Great Lakes:  Unlike commercial navigation, hydropower
is  affected directly by the outflow in the connecting channels.  But this outflow
is,  in turn, determined by the lake level.  As mentioned above, substitutes do exist
for hydropower, but they are more expensive.
Three major areas produce hydroelectric power:  upper Michigan at  the Sault
Ste.  Marie Locks  (Michigan and Ontario),  the Niagara River Falls to  Lake Ontario
(Ontario and New York) and the St. Lawrence River, which is  the outflow from Lake
Ontario  (Ontario and Quebec).  The distribution is much more concentrated than the
one for commercial navigation.  In addition, there are fewer states that produce
hydropower, and most of them are  located downstream.  This  is  a classic situation in
7which economic efficiency problems occur because of interdependencies.
Data was collected for  the different plants on the relationship between the
energy loss  and the flows  in the connecting channels,  as  well as  the lakes  elevation
between 1980 and 1988  (N.Y.P.A.,  1989, Ontario Hydro, 1987 and Hydro Quebec,  1988).
However, only the lake level variable  is  included in the cost equation, since lake
levels and outflows in the connecting channels are highly correlated.  The  loss  is
calculated as  the difference between hydropower and the best alternative source
existing for that state, multiplied by the energy loss for that month.  The  loss
equation can be written as:
(2)  PLossi,L,t - c (DLLL,t) + d (DLLLt) 2
Where:  PLossi,Lt  - power loss  to player i on lake L at time  t.
DLLL,t  = decreased lake level L at time t.
c,d  - cost coefficients to be estimated.
GAME THEORY MODEL
Much attention has been given to  analyzing different market structures by
looking at  the dynamics that arise from the interaction amongst different parties.
Game theory provides a method for looking at such dynamic interactions and is
particularly useful for resource extraction problems, where there are  interactions
over time among a finite number of players.  Some useful applications of this theory
to  natural resources where common property or open access is  a problem include:
Levhari and Mirman (1981) for the fisheries, Reinganum and Stokey (1985)  for
oligopoly extraction of nonrenewable resources, Eswaran and Lewis  (1984) for
renewable resources,  and Negry  (1989) for groundwater mining.
In applying the theory to the Great Lakes problem, we start with the following
transition equation:
8(3)  St+l  - St - f (Ylt,  Y2t.---.  Ynt)
Where St  is  the state variable, Yit is  the (lxn) control vector for the n players
for period t.  Player i faces  the following objective:
c  t
(4) Zi - p  0  Jit(St, Yltt--  . Ynt)  0<.<1  Vi e N.
t-O
Where Ji is  the payoff function for player i, at time t,9  is  the discount
factor and Zi is  the discounted objective function.  Player i tries to maximize  (2)
subject  to  (1)  where SO is  given and yi is nonnegative.  While  the constraints
described above can be estimated, we need a constraint on the way each player j
(where joi)  chooses a strategy.  This  constraint is not obvious,  since we are
dealing with expectations and not with stocks of resources.  Alternative assumptions
on what player i expects player j to choose, Yjt, will complete the  game's
characteristics and determine  the equilibrium.  Two  commonly used assumptions are
found in the  literature of dynamic  games.  First is  an open-loop in which players
decide at  the beginning of the game on a strategy path given the other player's
expected strategy path.  This path is called an open-loop Nash equilibrium, if for
each player, the path that they choose  is  the optimal  one, given the paths that the
other players choose  is  also optimal.  Thus, none of the players have an incentive
to  change their strategy, either in the beginning of the  game or during the game.
Formally defining an open-loop Nash equilibrium, we get the following extractions
vector set:
(5)  Zi*(S,  (Y  I  Y  co  )  t  * co  co  co  co
(5)  Zi so,  Ylt=0  .tO  {z  (yl)t-o  -- (yi-l)t-O  (Yi)t-O'  (Yi+l.t=O
,Ynt_  V(Yii)  E  Y.
9Where  {Yi)}t-  is  any other feasible strategy vector for player i.  In other words,
the extraction path will be optimal to  every player because we assume  that the  other
players will not change their strategies.  Necessary conditions  for this equilibrium
can be derived by solving n current value Hamiltonians.  The current value
Hamiltonian for player i is  the following:
(6) Hi - Ji  (') + Ai f(/),
where A is  a costate variable vector attached to  the stock.  The necessary
conditions  are:
aJi(.)  af(.)
(7)  ayi - Ai  ayi Vt
aHi
(8)  Ai,t+l  - Ai,t =  rAi - aSt
(9)  St+l  - St - f(Yl,y2,....Yn)
where r is  the  interest rate.  These conditions are also sufficient, provided the
concavity of the Hamiltonian in S and y.  Since our problem is  of an infinite
horizon, the transversality conditions are:
(10)  lim ft At > 0  and;
t-e
(11)  lim ft StAt =  0
t-*o
Conditions  (8) and (9),  together with the concavity of the Hamiltonian, are
sufficient for an optimum.
Starting from  (6),  we  get the following:




Substituting in  (5),  we get:
(13)  aJi - Ai  Vt
ayi
Solving the extraction path involves  solving difference equations, but if we
are  interested in the steady state of the system, we know that  in the steady state,
Ass - At+l - At,  thus:
aJit /aS t
(14)  A  -
t  r
which  is  the value of the stock to player i in a steady state.  The steady state
extraction rate  is  then obtained from the steady state costate variable.
The problem with an open-loop equilibrium is  its  strong assumption that players
solve the game  at the beginning of the game, where the solution is a vector of
extraction paths.  While the game's equilibrium is  consistent at  t=O,  it relies on
non-credible future behavior, which is  not necessarily in the  interest of player i
to fulfill.  A more reasonable assumption is  that players do not commit themselves
only to a time profile of actions, but to  a time-state profile, which results in a
decision rule.  The decision rule includes  the extraction as  a function of the  given
state at  the current time.  This kind of equilibrium will be called closed-loop  (or
feedback) equilibrium.  A closed-loop equilibrium is  subgame perfect, which means
that when the game  is played by the decision rules of the players, a Nash
11equilibrium is  reached at every stage of  the  game.  Thus,  the game is  time
consistent by definition.  The discounted objective  function for player i is  now
written:
(15)  Zi - Z  ftJi(St, Ylt  ,...,  Ynt)  VieN
t=o
But unlike the open-loop  case yj,  where jti  is  also a function of the state
variable,  i.e.,
(16)  yi,t - gi(St)  VieN,  Vt
the Nash equilibrium now will have the property that no player will have an
incentive to change the decision rule given the other player's decision rule,  thus:
*  *  *  *  *
(17)  Zi  yl(s)  ,  )  ,...yil()  yi()  i+()  ,  y..  n(S) 
'*  *  *  *
Zi yl(s),.....yil(s)  ,yi(s), Yi+l(s)  ,...--,Yn(S)  ViN,  Vyi(s)
The  current value Hamiltonian for player i will be:
(18)  Hi  St,yl(s),...Yn(s)  = Jist,Yl(s),...,Yn(s)  +
Aif  St,Yl(s),...,Yn(s)  Vt,  VieN
The Nash equilibrium will satisfy the following necessary conditions  (Starr and Ho,
1969):
12*  *  *
(19) yi - g (S)  maximize Hi(S,gl(S ),...,i  ....  gn(s)  Vt  ,  VieN
(20)  St+  - St - f(Yl,Y 2,...,yn)  Vt
17
(21)  At+l  - At - rAt  i  -Z  aHi  gj*  Vt,  VieN,  VjfieN
as  1 ayj  as
Equations  (17)  and (18)  have the  same structure as in the open-loop Nash
equilibrium.  The summation term in  (19)  is  the basis for the difference between the
two concepts.  This  interaction term indicates  the effect that player  i has on the
decision rule  of player j's Hamiltonian.  Intuitively, the explanation is  that:
player  i, by knowing how he or she can influence player j's extraction, will  take it
into account in his  or her maximization conditions.  When player i derives  the
canonical equation with respect to  the stock, he or she notices that St  is not only
in his  or her Hamiltonian,  but  in  the  others  as  well.  Moreover, the sign of
agj*  (S)/aS will probably be positive, thus  players will extract  less when the stock
level goes down.  This  in turn will offset the  losses  incurred by player i from
driving the stock down.  Therefore,  in equilibrium the stock level as well as the
shadow price will be lower in a closed-loop as compared to  the open-loop
equilibrium.  In a common property or open access resource model, where property
rights  are not well-defined, the closed-loop equilibrium seems more appropriate.
Notice that yi and Ai  are not functions of time any more, but  functions of the
stocks.  That is,  the decision rules are with respect to stocks without importance
to  the time that these  stocks are reached.
It should be mentioned at this point that open-loop and closed-loop do not
always differ.  Whenever a player cannot manipulate the stock or doesn't want to
13manipulate it,  there will not be any change between the  two concepts.  In the  common
property literature, it applies to the  two endpoint solutions, namely, the  open
access and social planner solutions.  In the open access,  it  is assumed the players
are  too small to  affect the stock, while in the social planner's problem, it  is  not
in his or her interest to  manipulate the stock.  When the number of players is
finite,  the  two concepts give rise  to different equilibrium values
Finally, it  is  important to realize  that a closed-loop equilibrium is  a Nash
equilibrium in the  sense of a given decision rule, but not in the context of an
extraction path.  Therefore, the feedback solutions are not the usual Nash
solutions, but rather non-Nash ones.  This occurs because players know that their
action will have an effect on their rivals' action, which implies that the
conjecture variation is no longer zero.  Additionally, it  is  the only conjecture
variation that  is consistent with profit maximization, since players will always do
whatever is  in their interest to do  (i.e.,  profit maximization).  Other conjecture
variations, while  sometimes more attractive, are harder to justify on the grounds of
some maximization behavior in a noncooperative sense  (see Mason et al.,  1988  and
Runge, 1986).
IMPLEMENTING THE MODEL
The parties involved in this  game are eight states  and two provinces.  The
eight U.S.  states are:  Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois,  Indiana,
Pennsylvania, Ohio and New York, while the two Canadian provinces are Ontario and
Quebec.  Thus, we have potential conflicts not only between states and provinces,
but also between countries.  Moreover, there are states  that have access to  more
than one lake.  In general,  the system has 4 state variables  (the lakes),  10  players
(states and provinces)  and 17  decision variables  (number of players with access to
each lake).
14In the Great Lakes game, player i on Lake L faces the following problem:
4  co
(22)  Max  i,L - Z  Z  Pt  Yi,L,t(P-VC) - NLoss(LLL,t) - PLoss  (LLLt)
Yi,L  L-1  tw0
s.t.
4  17
(23)  DLLL,t - yiek,L  VK,L - 1,2,3,4  Vi - 1,...,17
K-l  -1
(24) LLt_ 0 - LL  VL - 1,2,3,4
Here, ek,L is  the cross  lake coefficient.  That is,  the effect on all lakes  of
a given lake level reduction.  This  is  a 4x4 matrix with unit diagonal components
(that  is,  the effect of a lake on itself was normalized to  1).  While Yi  for every
player results  in a revenue  that is  directly related to the quantity sold, the  costs
are determined not only by player i, but by the others  as well.
The following current value Hamiltonian is:
4  17
(25)  Hi,L  Y,  yL(P-Vc)-NLoss(LL)-PLoss(LL) )+  Ai,  (k  i-  iLe  kL )
I~-  '  - J  "i  - i,.ik-1  i  ' -l
+  pi,L Yi,L
where pi,L is  the costate variable associated with the nonnegativity constraint.
The associated Kuhn-Tucker condition for this variable and Yi,L should be satisfied
in equilibrium  (Knapp, 1983).
(26)  ~i,L Yi,L - ;  Yi,L  0°  ;  i,L > 0
The other first order necessary conditions are the usual ones:
15BH
(27)  aHiL  =0
i1i,L
(28)  i,L  ri, - .L
aLL
and the transition equation (23).
In practice, what we require  is  that the decisions of the states will be
constrained to  diversions out of the  lake  and not diversions  into the  lake.
Whenever Yi,L equals zero, there will be a positive costate variable, pi,L which is
the effect on player  i of a unit of water diverted into the  lake.
The  fixed costs are not included in the necessary conditions.  The  outcome,
however, is  supposed to cover  the  amortized value of  the fixed cost.  If it  does
not, then the project is  assumed not to be built.
As mentioned above, there are 10 players  and 17  decision variables.  That means
that some of the players have more than one lake that they have access  to and
therefore have more than one decision variable.  Thus, whenever players  in this  game
choose a strategy, they take only part of the other strategies as givens.  The
strategies  that affect their payoffs are taken into account when they set their
first order conditions  for profit maximization.  In that case,  the associated
condition looks like:
4
(29)  NMB  -A  +Z  A
i,L  i,L  k-l  i,K
kfL
where NMB is  the net marginal benefit for player i on lake L.
Finally, it  is  important to understand that the water body dealt with is  a
large one.  The results of withdrawing water will reach its  full impact only after
about 15 years  (DeCooke et al.,  1984).  Moreover, the diversion from different lakes
have an additive effect.  In that case, we can separate the effects lake by lake.  A
16strategy which is the  steady state one will have a costate variable associated with
it, which is  a combination of two components--the effect up to  15 years, and the
effect 15 years and beyond.
Let the loss function for an industry i be:
(30)  Lossi - li 7LY +  2,i( Ly)2 vi  - 1,2
Note that i represents  industries and not players,  and r is  the effect of the
level of diverting ltcfs.  If we assume that  it takes 180 months  to get to the
steady state,  the present value of losses  to  industry i should be:
[,igiy+ 2g  i.iY+.  ..  +.  2  V  . 2+  . i (2 L) 2 
y J  a2i~  2.i8)2y [ml,  ig  Y  =___180i  l  7LY  +  2,iy  L 2 +
r2  for  t  <  180
r  for  t > 180
(l+r)180
or,  after some algebraic manipulation:
f  r  179  1-t  1  2  2  r  180  2,-  ,1  -
(32)  PVLoss - y  [  t(l+r)
1 +  iL y [  t (l+r)t  ]
+  oc  180  iLY  +  2.i  (180-)2  y2
r(l+r) 180
where y is  the sum of all diversions adjusted by the cross lake affects and each
player treats his rivals'  decisions as  givens.
The closed loop equilibrium is calculated by,  again,  solving a system of
17equations.  This  time,  the coefficients are different, since players take into
account their effect on other players.  The effect of other players extractions on
player i himself is  implicitly taken into account by solving  the  set of equations
simultaneously.  Recall that every player other than i has a decision rule  that
depends on stock.  That is:
(33) yj  g  [S(Yi  ...Yi,...,.)]
player  i, resets his  first order condition based on this  information.  With respect
to player j he gets:
*
(34)  ag  < 0
ay i
However, there are  several players,  thus:
*
(35)  . ag  < 0
ji  ay,
(35)  is  the  "manipulation affect".  Every player on the system manipulates  the  stock
according to  (35),  since he thinks  that he will increase his profit.  The
inefficiency increases because every body thinks  so.  Equation  (32)  for the closed-
loop solution becomes:
(36)  PVLoss-  [oc l i L gi  gl(Yl'  ... 'Yn ) + ... +  gn (Yl'''  Yn)) ] 
[179  1-t  2  *  . .
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I180  2  1-t
[1  t2 (l+r)  +
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The equilibrium is,  thus,  computed in two stages.  In the first stage, each
player faces the following problem:  departing from the open loop equilibrium, how
much more can he extract without affecting his  cost and thus,  increasing his profit?
The  answer is  to  increase the extraction as long as  it will not affect the lake
level.  This,  in turn, depends on the reaction of the other players  to his action.
The second stage  is  reached when all the  first order conditions are  solved together
after adjusting the coefficients of the derivative of the payoff matrix (Hessiqan)
according to the manipulation affect.  When players are not identical, it  is
possible that players will divert less  than in open loop after taking into account
their rivals'  closed-loop strategies.  It  is  so because only on the second stage,
players actually are  taking into  account that not only are they playing a closed
loop strategy, but  that all of the other players  are doing the  same.
RESULTS
Based on the physical and hydrological data, as well as the economic indicators,
it  is possible  to construct the following games:  1) Social Planner's  Game (a 1-
player game);  2) U.S. vs.  Canada - Open-loop (a two-country game);  3) U.S. vs.
Canada - Closed-loop  (a two-country game);  4) Ten Players  - Open-loop;  and, 5) Ten
Players  - Closed-loop.
19The best regression estimates for the  impacts  of reduced lake level include
only the squared term for the decreased lake  level.  In general  these results were
as  good or better than a regression which includes both reduced lake level and the
quadratic  term for it.  Since we wanted to keep  one functional form, we chose  to
concentrate on the reduced square term  (Table 1).  The cross  lake affects are given
in Table 2 (these are ratios for  the  total affect) while the inner lake affect for
the first  15 years  is  given in Table 3.
Game 1 (Social Planner's Game):  The  social planner's  game is  set up  so  the
discounted net benefit of  the whole basin, subject to  hydrological and nonnegativity
constraints, are maximized.  It  is  as  if all the  lake  uses in the basin are under
one ownership and all the  impacts  of diverting lake water are taken into account.
Table 4 gives  the  solution for 0.4% real monthly interest rate.  The  socially
optimal diversion is  to  increase the Chicago diversion by 0.71  tcfs and to build a
new project on Lake Ontario to  divert 10.55  tcfs.  Since the present value of the
project benefits minus annual variable costs  is  larger than the fixed cost  ($3,200
million),  the project passes  the economic efficiency test.  These discounted
benefits are for an infinite time period, with a constant stream of monthly
benefits.  This means, of course, that  at higher discount rates and/or lower water
prices, benefits would drop relative to  costs and diversions would be less economic.
Surprisingly, a significant part of the supply is being taken from a lake which
produces an important part of the hydroelectric power in the basin.  However,
withdrawals from this  lake  do not affect the upper lakes.  In contrast, taking
water from the upper lakes will result in a chain effect that will cost more  than
can be compensated for by revenues generated.
20Games  2 and 3 (U.S. vs.  Canada:  Open-loop/ Closed-loop):  In the two country games
there is no difference between the open-loop and the closed-loop solutions  (Table
5).  The reason is  that only the U.S.  "wins" in the open-loop game, thus they have
no  incentive to  further drive down the  lake levels because Canada is  already not
diverting.  Canada could influence the U.S. by extracting water, but they will lose
even more than the U.S. for every inch the  lakes drop.  Thus,  the best strategy for
Canada is  to play 0 in both games while the U.S.'s best strategy is  to divert 44
tcfs from Lake Ontario.  The U.S.  gains about $31 billion (excluding fixed costs),
while Canada loses more than $90 billion.  The total social loss of $61,457 million
versus $7,981 million benefit for the social optimum solution, clearly indicates  the
inefficiency of moving from a one player to a two player game or  solution.  This is
all based on the highly unlikely assumption that the U.S.  could divert and sell as
much water as it wanted at $100/ac.  ft.  However, the important  lesson to be gained
is  the distribution of benefits and costs and how they influence  the decision.
Games 4 and 5 (Ten Players  - Open-loop/Closed-loop):  All the diversions  in these
games are  above Lake Ontario  (Table 6).  These diversions  increase the losses
imposed on the whole basin.  The  incentive  to  increase the amount of water diverted
from  the Great Lakes as well as  a shift in the location of the diversion results
from the location of states around the  lakes  and the distribution of costs and
benefits  of diversions.  Lake  Erie is  a big problem.  While a significant part of
the hydropower facilities  is  located in the outflow from the  lake, certain states
such as  Pennsylvania, are  affected very little by reduced lake  levels.  This
difference in cost incidence of large diversions causes very large  losses for New
York and the  two Canadian provinces.
It is  important to note that, while there are several states  that are diverting
21water (4 in the open-loop game and 5 in the closed-loop game),  only Pennsylvania
"wins" while all the others have a negative present value of benefits.  This is
exactly the essence of the "tragedy of the Commons."  States divert water not
because they will gain something but because they will lose less by doing so.  The
difference  in the losses results because if they do not divert,  some other state
will.  If the difference in losses  is  larger than the fixed cost,  the state gains
from building it.
The  open-loop and the closed-loop solution is  the additional  amount of water
diverted from Lakes Superior  and Michigan-Huron.  This difference is  a function of
the cost of impacts on various  states  as well as  the hydrological relationships
among the  lakes.  The major difference is  a diversion from Lake  Superior  (the
Wisconsin part) as  well as  the doubling of the diversion from Lake Michigan-Huron by
Illinois  and Indiana.  The  "tragedy"  increases  since everybody tries  to manipulate
the stock (lake levels).  The  results suggest that the open-loop equilibrium under
estimates the  true social loss by 34%.  The difference in benefits for binding
agreements to  limit state diversions  are quite large and can prevent about one-third
of the externality involved in managing the  lakes by states  and provinces as
compared to  the social planner.
SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Different market structures can give rise to  totally different supply patterns
of water from the Great Lakes.  The lakes are characterized by different types  of
users.  This fact is  the core reason for conflicting incentives, which result in
large losses if lake diversions are not regulated.  The fact  that the big users  of
water as  a stock are  located downstream, can result  in large losses if downstream
water rights are  ignored.
22Neither Ontario nor Quebec have an incentive  to extract  large amounts of water.
Thus,  the incentive  to reach an agreement to restrict water withdrawals rests mainly
with the two Canadian provinces and the States of New York and Michigan.
Formulating the game  as  an open-loop game does not account  for the  "strategic
externality," which basically is  a weak assumption.  Players  generally do not
necessarily have a strong incentive  to  remain in their original  strategies if  it  is
not in their best  interest.  Thus  the closed-loop game is more realistic for open
access resources or what some call the Commons.  The benefits of managing an open
access resource become higher when the possibility of  "feedback" strategies is
recognized through the open-loop game.
Finally, it should be mentioned that more research is needed with respect to
the demand side, which is  ignored in this  study.  The  incorporation of the demand,
however, is much more difficult than the  supply because of data problems.  The
inadequate demand estimates resulted in diversions from Lakes Ontario, Erie and
Michigan-Huron that are unrealistically large.  What the results really show  is that
small water diversions or withdrawals from certain lakes,  either for use  inside or
outside  the basin, might pass  the economic efficiency test.  Yet because of the
unequal distribution of benefits and costs of water diversions among states, several
states and the U.S.  federal government may have economic incentives  to  promote
socially inefficient diversions.  In addition, more research is  needed on other
types  of expectation formation, other than the open- and closed-loops  (Mason,  et
al.,  1988).  The best expectations are those that could be verified in reality,
which is very difficult to do.
23Table 1
Cost  Coefficients for Water Diversion or Withdrawals
(for Losses  in Millions $/in drop in Lake Level)
Michigan-
Superior  Huron  Erie  Ontario
Navigation Hydropower  Nav.  Hydro.  Nav.  Hydro.  Nav.  Hydro.
MN  .0036  - -
WI  .0015  - .0012  - - -
MI  - .007  .007  - .0025 
IL  - - .0028  - - -
IN  - - .0027  - - - - -
OH  - --  - .0050
PA  --  - - .0004  - - -
NY  - - - - .0004  .033  .00014  .02
ONT  .0015  .0061  .0027  - .00046  .033  .0011  .02
Q  - --  - - .0022  .0368
Table  2
Cross  Lake Coefficients  (ratio) for Water Diversion or Withdrawals
Idiver-  \ affects  |  Michigan-
Ision from\  upon I  Superior  Huron  Erie  Ontario
Superior  1.00  1.32  .92  1.08
Michigan-Huron  0.31  1.00  .69  .72
Erie  0.15  0.38  1.00  1.02
Ontario  0  0  0  1.00
24Table 3
Monthly Inner Lake Affect for Water Diversion or Withdrawals
(for the first 180 months,
in inches per ltcfs)
Michigan-
Superior  Huron  Erie  Ontario
.0033  .0045  .0032  .0008




Diversion  A  (inches)  PV of Net
(tcfs)  in Steady State  Benefits  (million $)
Superior  - .13  -5.36
Michigan-Huron  0.71  .58  984.71
Erie  -. 28  -113.99
Ontario  10.55  1.59  7115.80
Total:  11.26  -7981.16
25Table 5
U.S. vs.  Canada:  Open-loop and Closed-loop Equilibria
PV of Net Benefits
Diversion  (tcfs)  Lake Level A  (inches)  (Million $)
Open-Loop / Closed-loop  Open-loop / Closed-loop  Open-loop / Closed-loop
SUP:  - 0
U.S.  0  - 0
Canada  0  0
M-H:  - 0
U.S.  0  - 0
Canada  0  0
Erie:  - 0  -
U.S.  0  - 0
Canada  0  0
Ont:  - 6.33 
U.S.  43.95  -31,360
Canada  0  -- 92,817
Total:  43.95  6.33  -61,457
26Table 6
The Ten Players Game
PV of Net Benefits
Diversion  (tcfs)  Lake Level A (inches)  Million $
Open-Loop  Closed-loop  Open-loop  Closed-Loop  C
SUP:
MN  0  0  21.98  34.99  -274.10  -694.59
WI  0  8.11  - - -126.90  -151.46
MI  0  0  - -53.30  -135.06
ONT  0  0  - -160.66  -407.11
MH:  - - 83.28  127.75 
MI  0  0  - - -1001.82  -1800.47
WI  0  0  - - -131.15  -262.67
ONT  0  0  - - -295.08  -694.46
IL  21.12  42.7  - -- 55.61  31.86
IN  21.12  42.7  --  -55.61  31.86
Erie:  --  108.60  131.63  -
ONT  0  0  - - -69,781.48  -105.432.51
MI  0  0  - - -4647.35  -7,021.66
OH  11.39  11.58  - - -800.33  -1,207.35
PA  148.02  150.55  --  772.90  841.08
NY  0  0  --  -69,716.42  -105,334.21
ONT:  - - 27.79  33.93
NY  0  0  --  -51,079.67  -76,127.00
ONT  0  0  --  -53,514.42  -79,755.67
Q  0  0  --  -98,913.00  -147,415.67
Total:  201.64  255.64  --  -349,834.00  -525,535.09
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